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LOMA LINDA UNIVERSIIY 
CENTER FOR 
CHRISTIAN BIOETHICS 
Volume 8, No. 1 (February, 1992) 
Faith, Medicine, and Religious Liberty 
Part I 
Jehovah's Witnesses 
Blood Transfusions: 
A Patient's Right to Refuse 
Robert D. Orr, M.D. 
Mr. Pulaski is a 49-year-old, non-English-speaking, Polish 
immigrant who works as a plumber's assistant He is married and 
has three children living at home. He was admitted yesterday to 
a Catholic hospital for elective surgical removal of a benign-
appearing polyp from the descending colon, because itwas found 
to be too large to be removed through acolonoscope. Theconsent 
dialogue took place between the patient and a surgical resident 
who is fluent in Polish. During the discussion, the patient told the 
surgeon that he was a Jehovah's Witness and did not want to be 
given any blood. The resident asked if he would be willing to 
donate and accept autologous blood should he need transfusion, 
and he said No. The patient was assured that the need for 
transfusion in this operation was very unlikely. The resident 
wrote in the progress notes a description of the consent discussion, 
and included the statement, "the patient refuses blood for 
religious reasons." No preoperative order was written for type and 
cross-match of blood. 
Surgery started just over one hour ago, and is being done by 
an experienced attending surgeon and a resident (not the one 
who obtained consent). Surgical exposure has been difficult 
About fifteen minutes ago a retractor, inadvertendy dropped, 
punctured the spleen causing massive bleeding. An anatomical 
variation in blood supply is making removal of the spleen difficult 
The patient has lost about 4,000 cc. of blood, is receiving 
intravenous Ringer's lactate and albumin at the highest possible 
rate, but is still hypotensive. He is very likely to die without 
transfusion. 
Should the attending surgeon transfuse the patient? 
Jehovah's Witnesses and 
Blood Transfusion 
Ralph R. Tabbert, Chairman 
Riverside Hospital Liaison Committee 
Hospital Committee of Jehovah's Witnesses 
With reference to the proceeding case study, ethically, 
morally, and legally, we would have to answer NO! When the 
patient was admitted to the hospital for surgery, he informed the 
doctor and hospital that he refused a blood transfusion under any 
circumstances, even if he could not survive without it. He 
signed a release form absolving the hospital, staff, and surgeons 
of responsibility for any untoward effects from his choice. 
Although the surgeons performing the procedure were not 
the physicians who initially discussed this case with Mr. Pulaski, 
they were still responsible for making themselves aware of 
anything that might affect the care of their patient, even as they 
would be aware of the presence of allergies or underlying 
diseases. Also, the restrictions and release forms would have 
been included in Mr. Pulaski's medical records which the 
surgeons would be obliged to review prior to surgery. 
Next Issue: 
Faith, Medicine, and 
Religious Liberty 
Part II 
Christian Science 
Obviously then, by proceeding with the surgery, they 
demonstrated their willingness to work within the limitations 
imposed by the patient, and the surgeons would be morally, 
ethically and legally obliged to respect Mr. Pulaski's wishes 
even though he was unconscious. 
Are Jehovah's Witnesses, by refusing blood transfusions 
even in such "life-threatening" situations, exercising the 'right 
to die'? 
Absolutely not! IfJehovah's Witnesses wanted to die, they 
would not seek the care of a physician in the first place. The fact 
is, Jehovah's Witnesses do not want to die! They want to live! 
And so they willingly seek out qualified health care from 
professionals who will respect their deeply held values and 
beliefs. 
Why do Jehovah's Witnesses object to receiving blood into 
their bodies? Because of what the Bible states about God's 
prohibition of the consumption of blood. 
Genesis 9:3, 4, is the first reference in the Bible where 
Jehovah God prohibits eating blood: "Every moving animal that 
is alive may serve as food for you. As in the case of green 
vegetation, I do give it all to you. Only flesh with its soul-its 
blood-you must not eat." This injunction was given following 
the flood to Noah, his wife, their three sons and their wives. 
Since only these eight people remained of the human race, the 
injunction was, in effect, given to all mankind. 
Later when Jehovah God began dealing with the nation of 
Israel, he restated his prohibition: "As for any man of the sons 
of Israel or some alien resident who is hunting catches a wild 
beast or a fowl that may be eaten, he must in that case pour its 
blood out and cover it with dust. For the soul of every sort of flesh 
is its blood by the soul in it. Consequently I said to the sons of 
Israel: 'You must not eat the blood of any sort of flesh, because 
the soul of every sort of flesh is its blood. Anyone eating it will 
be cut off.'" Leviticus 17:13, 14. 
Following the death 00 esus Christ and the formation of the 
Christian congregation, a controversy arose as to what, if any, of 
the Law covenant they were obliged to keep. Acts 15:28,29 says: 
"For the holy spirit and we ourselves have favored adding no 
further burden to you, except these necessary things, to keep 
abstaining from things sacrificed to idols and from blood and 
from things strangled and from fornication. If you carefully keep 
yourselves from these things, you will prosper." 
The command against eating blood was no mere dietary 
restriction but a moral restriction every bit as serious as fornica-
tion or idolatry. Jehovah's Witnesses are a dedicated people who 
strive to live their lives in a manner that does not violate God's 
laws. To the Witnesses, a blood transfusion is the moral 
equivalent of fornication; hence, forcing a blood transfusion 
upon them would be morally and emotionally equivalent to rape 
by the physician. For a Witness to passively agree to being raped 
would be unacceptable under all circumstances regardless of the 
consequences. (compare Deuteronomy 22:23-27). 
Blood transfusion is commonly thought of as being synony-
mous with life. Thus, slogans such as "Give the gift oflife-give 
blood!" are commonly seen. Witnesses are said to refuse 
"lifesaving" blood transfusions, regardless of whether blood was 
deemed necessary or not and regardless of whether the patient 
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lived or not. If someone refuses a "lifesaving" blood transfusion 
and yet lives, then what kind of treatment did he accept? Was 
it not lifesaving as well? This unfair portrayal of blood as alway' 
"lifesaving" is not only inaccurate, but it serves to inflame thosL 
who are ignorant of the lethal dangers of blood transfusion. It 
also implies that medically valid alternatives were not used or 
even available. This is simply not the case. 
It is because of the very real danger inherent in blood 
transfusions that the Report of The Presidential Commission on 
the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic, (1988) p. 79, 
stated: 
"Informed consent for transfusion of blood or its compo-
nents should include an explanation of the risks involved with 
the transfusion of blood and its components, including the 
possibility of HIV infection, and information about appropriate 
alternatives to homologous blood reinfusion therapy ... .In health 
care facilities, all reasonable strategies to avoid homologous 
transfusion (blood from others) should be implemented." 
This report emphasized the need for discussion "about 
appropriate alternatives to homologous blood transfusion 
therapy," which is precisely what Jehovah's Witnesses are 
asking for. To assist physicians in becoming aware of these 
alternatives, the Witnesses have taken the initiative to organize 
hospital liaison committees. This has been done in the United 
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States and the rest of the world. These committees serve the 
needs of the nearly 10,000, 000 Jehovah's Witnesses in 212lands. 
'\ The hospital liaison committees have obtained the names 
of cooperative physicians who are experienced with alternative 
nonblood management. Over 8,000 cooperative physicians and 
specialists are listed for the United States alone. 
Had the hospital or physicians contacted the local hospital 
liaison committee in the case of Mr. Pulaski, they could have 
been informed on alternative nonblood medical management. 
This includes information on techniques of minimizing blood 
loss such as electrocautery, lasers, and the argon beam coagulator. 
Having information on such devices might have prompted the 
surgeons to have one or more of these on hand to assist them in 
limiting blood loss. 
The local hospital liaison committee could have worked 
with the surgeons to establish how the patient felt concerning 
the use of "Cell Saver" type devices that recover and reinfuse 
blood from a wound site before it leaves the body. As experi-
enced ministers, they could have explained how the machine 
works and under what circumstances an individual Christian 
might find its use scripturally acceptable. 
Unfortunately, the local hospital liaison committee was not 
consulted and since the surgeons could not use homologous 
blood, they found themselves unprepared to deal with the 
emergency. This was an inexcusable breech of the trust Mr. 
Pulaski placed in these physicians, since they had prior notice of 
the special circumstances involved and had agreed to accommo-
date his beliefs. 
These physicians should have taken the steps necessary to 
accommodate the patient as they had promised rather than 
requiring the patient to compromise the values and principles 
that make his life meaningful. Ethically, morally, and legally, 
the doctors should have been prepared to honor the patient's 
requirement of non blood therapy, a choice he has a right to 
exercise, by equipping themselves to deal with the potential 
problems they might face. 
Jehovah's Witnesses are frequently 
asked the following questions. 
Here are my answers. 
Under what circumstances would "Cell Saver" machines 
be acceptable to Jehovah's Witnesses? 
Where there is no storage of blood and the integrity of the 
system is maintained, this is a matter for each one to decide. 
Many Witnesses have reasoned that diverted blood in such an 
external circuit might be viewed as an extension of the circula-
tory system. They have allowed the use of these devices 
provided that they are not primed with blood, but with a 
'1onblood solution. The use of some of these machines involves 
olood storage, not just an occasional brief interruption in flow. It 
is objectionable to store blood for some time in a mechanical 
system with no ongoing reinfusion. 
Do Jehovah's Witnesses receive organ transplants? 
The Witnesses do not feel that the Bible comments directly 
on organ transplants; hence, decisions regarding cornea, kidney, 
or other tissue transplants must be made by the individual 
Witness. 
Why is it that some Jehovah's Witnesses accept blood 
fractions such as albumin? 
In modern medicine, transfusions have changed from the 
earlier World War II experience when primarily whole blood was 
transfused. Now blood can be divided into its major compo-
nents- red cells, white cells, plasma, and platelets. The use of 
a major blood component to accomplish a purpose similar to that 
of taking a transfusion of whole blood would be in violation of the 
Scriptural command to "abstain from blood." 
However, there are about 30 types of proteins such as 
albumin and globulins present in blood plasma. These are 
considered "minor" fractions since they comprise such a small 
portion of whole blood and do not serve to nourish or feed the 
body. When minor fractions or derivatives of blood are used to 
fight against disease or assist in clotting the blood (such as 
hemophiliac preparations), it is left as a matter of conscience for 
each Witness to decide. 
Why have Jehovah's Witnesses only objected to blood 
transfusions during the last fifty years and not earlier? 
Blood transfusions first became popular during World War 
II. Because of their wide use on the battlefield, doctors returning 
to private practice continued with the routine use of blood. Prior 
to World War II, blood transfusion was not in frequent use, so the 
issue did not come up. Jehovah's Witnesses have always 
understood it to be morally wrong to eat blood. When new 
techniques were developed for feeding it into the body, these 
also were rejected. 
This high regard for the sanctity of blood has historically 
influenced Christians. Second-century writer Tertullian said: 
"At the trials of Christians you offer them sausages filled with 
blood. You are convinced, of course, that the very thing with 
which you try to make them deviate from the right way is 
unlawful for them. How is it that, when you are confident that 
they will shudder at the blood of an animal, you believe they will 
pant eagerly after human blood?" Tertullian, ApologeticalWorks, 
and Minucius Felix, Octavius, translated by Rudolph Arbesmann 
(1950), p. 33. Third-century writer Eusebius quoted a young 
girl, one of many Christians falsely accused of eating children, 
as saying: "How can we eat infants, -we, to whom it is not lawful 
to eat the blood of beasts.' The History of the Christian Church 
(1837), by William Jones, p. 106. 
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Conclusion 
Jehovah's Witnesses seek the assistance of the medical 
profession to do all it can to help them while also respecting their 
conscientious objection to blood. We urge all physicians to avail 
themselves of the local hospital liaison committee arrangement. 
It has been established to assist physicians in caring for the needs 
ofJehovah's Witnesses. They may contact the world headquar-
ters of Jehovah's Witnesses, Department of Hospital Informa-
tion Services, at (718) 625-3600, for further information on 
alternative non blood management, or for the telephone number 
of the nearest hospital liaison committee to them .• 
Blood Transfusions: 
A Patient's Right to Refuse 
Robert D. OtT, M.D. 
Family Practice Medicine 
Director of Clinical Ethics 
Loma Linda University Medical Center 
Co-Director, Center for Christian Bioethics 
Loma Linda University 
I look at this question as a practicing physician and as 
an ethicist, and would like to emphasize that these thoughts 
apply to a competent adult, not to a child. 
As a physician, I understand the clinician's response, "I 
can't let him die!" Medical training pushes us to do all we can 
to save lives. We often operate under what Fuchs, an economist, 
calls the "technological imperative"; I can do, therefore, I must 
do. It's seductive. It feels right to the clinician standing at the 
bedside watching his patient bleed to death. 
However, I was also taught, though not so loudly or so 
forcefully, that "the ability to act does not justify the action." 
Just because we can do something doesn't mean we must, or even 
that we should. Just because we can do a heart transplant doesn't 
automatically mean that we should do one on every patient who 
goes into intractable pump failure. Thus decisions have to be 
made. This is where medical judgment and clinical ethics 
merge. 
I am saying that there are times when I need not do 
what I can do. There are times when I must not do what I can 
do. This may seem relatively easy when the treatment is 
complex, expensive, scarce, risky, has marginal benefit, orwhen 
there is an alternative treatment available. Physicians find it 
more difficult when they are asked to withhold a treatment that 
is simple, inexpensive, readily available, safe, and effective, or 
when there is no other treatment available for this patient. It 
may be easier to forgo treatment when the patient is elderly or 
demented, but more difficult if the patient is young and alert. It 
may be easier when the disease is irreversible and has occurred 
spontaneously, but particularly difficult if the disease is revers-
ible, or if their treatment was responsible for the condition that 
is threatening to take the patient's life. 
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There are several reasons for not using a particular 
treatment: when it won't work; when the risk is disproportionate 
to the benefit; when the cost is disproportionate to the benefi( 
or when the patient refuses the treatment. 
Blood transfusions work. The risk of transfusion is 
generally acceptable. The cost is modest. But people who 
subscribe to the Jehovah's Witness faith refuse blood transfu-
SIOn. 
Whenever a patient refuses a specific therapeutic rec-
ommendation, it is the physician's obligation to find out why he/ 
she is refusing. Jehovah's Witnesses refuse blood transfusions 
because they believe it violates God's commands. It is a moral 
reason, and according to their beliefs, breaking this command 
carries with it grave eternal consequences. It is not that they 
want to die. They want to live. But they place a greater value 
on being obedient to their interpretation of God's law than they 
do on life itself. It is a rational reason. It is rational because it is 
explainable and is agreed upon by a group of like-minded 
people. I happen to disagree with their interpretation of Scrip-
ture on this point. But my disagreement does not automatically 
make their reason irrational. My disagreement does not give me 
the authority to ride rough-shod over their individual right to 
self-determination. 
How do physicians generally respond to a patient who 
refuses a recommended therapy that makes very good clinical 
sense to them? They may get angry; they usually feel frustrated. 
But it is also possible for them to try to understand the reason for 
refusal, and accept that reason if it is rational. 
What is the range of responses that a physician ma. 
have when a Jehovah's Witness refuses blood? It is important 
that there be clear understanding on both sides of the discussion. 
The physician must be clear in his or her mind that the patient 
has firmly accepted the Jehovah's Witness teaching; clear that it 
is not a passing fancy; clear that he/she has not been coerced into 
mouthing this tenet without personally believing it. At the same 
time the patient must be clear what risk he/she is taking; clear 
about both the likelihood of needing blood and the severity of 
the biological consequences if he/she does not get blood. 
Jehovah's Witnesses refuse blood 
transfusions because they believe 
it violates God's commands. 
If it is an elective situation, and the physician does not 
wish to provide care within those patient-imposed limitations, 
he or she has the right to decline to participate and refer th, 
patient elsewhere, although I would vote for cooperation ana 
acceptance of the patient's limitations. In an emergency situa-
tion, referral is not an option. 
When a physician is providing care to a Jehovah's 
Witness, either by agreement in an elective situation, or by 
necessity in an emergency, it is physically possible in many 
situations to transfuse the patient over his/her objection. This 
may be done forcefully on a vulnerable patient, or this may be 
done by asking a court to authorize the transfusion. Alterna-
tively, the physician may respect the patient's right to refuse 
even life-saving therapy and try his or her best to save the life 
with every other means possible. The physician may accept a 
hemoglobin level below the accepted standard; they may use 
other volume expanders; they may use unusual technologies to 
preserve and salvage the patient's blood; and finally they may 
allow the patient to endanger his or her life. 
The physician may respect the patient's 
right to refuse life-saving therapy 
and try ... to save the life with 
every other means possible. 
When is it ethically justifiable to override a patient's 
refusal of treatment? Ethicists generally agree that three condi-
tions must be met: 1) the patient must demonstrate some defect 
in reasoning, i.e., be incompetent or irrational; 2) there must be 
grave consequences of non-intervention; and 3) the conse-
quences of non-intervention must be greater than the conse-
quences of intervention. The Jehovah's Witness who refuses 
life-saving blood does not meet these criteria. 
Physicians are justifiably concerned about their liabil-
ity in these situations. There is no question that a physician 
might be sued forassaultifhe or she transfuses a refusing patient 
without a court order to intervene. A physician might be sued for 
abandonment if he or she failed to do everything else possible 
short of transfusion to save the life. A physician might be sued 
for breach of responsibility for failure to inform a patient that he 
or she was transfused while unconscious. It is theoretically 
possible that a physician might be sued for negligence for failure 
to transfuse if there is a bad outcome, although Witnesses are 
usually eager to sign a release from responsibility to avert that 
possibility. Finally, it is possible for the patient, or the patient's 
survivors, to sue the physician for negligence if the blood loss 
was caused by the physician's treatment. It seems, however, 
that a conscientious physician practicing good medicine is less 
likely to be found liable for respecting the patient's wishes than 
for overriding them. 
Should a physician seek a court order to transfuse a 
Jehovah's Witness who is dying from lack of blood? A good 
rule of thumb is that if the patient is a competent adult, you 
.,hould have a good reason for going to court; and if the 
'patient is a minor, you should have a good reason for not 
going to court (such as, the patient is a mature minor, or the 
patient will likely die even with transfusions) .• 
A Patient's Right to Refuse Blood 
Transfusions: 
The Legal Rights of Privacy, Autonomy, 
and Free Exercise of Religion 
Andrea Scott, J.D. 
Cooper, Brown and Scharf 
Pasadena, California 
California leads a majority of states in following the view, 
first enunciated in 1914 by Supreme Court Justice Benjamin 
Cardozo, that "[e]very human being of adult years and sound 
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own 
body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his 
patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in 
damages." 1 
The right of an individual to be free from unwanted 
contact with another presently is viewed as a right of privacy 
which recognizes an individual's interest in preserving "the 
inviolability of the person.,,2 When used in medical contexts, 
the right of privacy is often called the right of patient autonomy. 
Considered basic and fundamental,3 the right of privacy has 
been found to derive from the constitutional penumbra of rights 
guaranteed by the Fifth and Ninth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution.4 Additionally, many state constitutions 
specifically guarantee certain rights of privacy, such as Article I, 
Section I of the California Constitution.5 
Until the 1970s, courts tended to order blood transfu-
sions for com petent adul t Jehovah's Witnesses, against their will 
and regardless of whether minor dependents were involved.6 
During the past two decades, however, the trend clearly has 
moved toward upholding a competent adult Jehovah's Witness' 
right to reject the transfusion. Although the First Amendment 
free exercise of religion clause may be partially responsible for 
this change, more likely it is due to a heightened awareness by 
the judiciary and the public of the rights of privacy and patient 
autonomy in the face of biotechnological innovation. 
The question of whether or not a Jehovah's Witness has 
the right to refuse a life-saving blood transfusion is subsumed 
under the rubric of any competent adult patient's right to refuse 
medical treatment. Generally, the competent adult patient or 
his/her legal surrogate decision-maker has near-complete dis-
cretion to determine which treatment he/she will or will not 
accept. He/she may refuse life-saving "heroic" measures as well 
as lesser forms of treatment? Similarly, competent adult pa-
tients without minor dependents may reject medical procedures 
for religious reasons or for any reason at all, rational or irrational, 
reasonable or unreasonable, regardless of the treating physician's 
advice.8 
The judiciary may impose limitations on this rule, how-
ever, if anyone of four state interests are considered to outweigh 
the patient's right to physical self-determination. These state 
interests include: (1) preserving life; (2) protecting the interests 
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of innocent third parties; (3) preventing suicide (a topic which 
lies outside the scope of this article); and (4) maintaining the 
ethical integrity of the medical profession.9 
In contrast to cases in which courts authorize competent 
adult patients to reject treatment are cases in which the adult 
patient's medical condition directly or indirectly affects the 
welfare of "innocent" third parties such as a fetus or a child 
financially and emotionally dependent solely upon the pa-
tient.10 In such instances, courts often intervene in the deci-
sion-making process in favor of preserving life. They do so by 
acting in the capacity of parens patriae, 110r the legal surrogate 
parent who balances the best interests of the fetus or child 
against those of the natural parent. 
F or example, in Jehovah's Witnesses In the state o/Washing-
ton v. King County Hospital Unit No.1, 12 the federal court 
authorized future life-saving blood transfusions for any Jehovah's 
Witness children who might require them, despite objections 
from the parents. The court based its ruling on the belief that, 
"[t]he right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to 
expose ... the child ... to ill health or death ... Parents may be free to 
become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow [that] they 
are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their 
children before they have reached the age of full and legal 
discretion when they can make that choice for themselves." 13 
Thus, what at first glance may appear to be invasive 
paternalism on the part of the state in preempting the right of 
Jehovah's Witnesses is, in fact, an attempt by the state to protect 
minors from the consequences of their own (as well as their 
parents') choices until they are capable of more mature reflec-
tion. 
Courts often interfere in the decision-
making process in favor of preserving life. 
Similarly, the matter of incompetent patients is consid-
ered within the context of the state's interests of preserving life 
and protecting innocent third parties. In California, the law has 
been interpreted to stand for "the general proposition that 
incompetent persons retain certain fundamental rights", 14 in-
cluding the right to refuse treatment. Although the judiciary 
recognizes that it would be "a legal fiction at best" to claim that 
an incompetent person's "right to choose" survives incompe-
tence,15 "[a]llowing persons to determine their own medical 
treatment is an important way in which society respects persons 
as individuals. Moreover, the respect due to persons as individu-
als does not diminish simply because they have become inca-
pable of participating in treatment decision." 16 
The majority of courts, therefore, have held that an 
incompetent person is entitled to have a conservator or legal 
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surrogate exercise their right to refuse medical treatment. Where 
a controversy arises regarding the surrogate's decision, the 
judiciary's inquiry focuses solely upon the question of whether 
based on all the available information, the surrogate is acting in 
the incompetent person's best interests. 17 
The fourth state interest consists of maintaining the 
ethical integrity of the medical profession. 1S Once again, the 
majority view has shifted during the past two decades. For-
merly, courts would authorize physicians to provide unwanted 
Allowing persons to determine their own 
medical treatment is an important way in 
which society respects persons as 
individuals 
blood transfusions to Jehovah's Witnesses19 and other compe-
tent adult patients without minor dependents. Currently, most 
jurisdictions allow such patients to reject even life-saving trans-
fusions. 20 The rationale is best expressed in a passage from 
Bartling. "if the right of the patient to self-determination as to 
his own medical treatment is to have any meaning at all, it must 
be paramount to the interests of the patient's hospital and 
doctors." 21 
By the same token, a majority of jurisdictions hold that 
physicians need not fear legal liability for respecting a compel 
tent adult Jehovah's Witness' request to forgo a life-saving 
transfusion. The rule does not stand for the proposition that a 
physician or health-care institution will not be held liable for civil 
and criminal liability for negligence in the performance of other 
therapy.22 To the contrary, a Jehovah's Witness' refusal to 
permit a life-saving blood transfusion does not release a physi-
cian or health-care institution from liability for negligence. Such 
deliberate refusal, however, does release a doctor or institution 
from legal responsibility for unfavorable reactions or untoward 
results, including death. 23 
It is reasonable to predict that as biotechnology 
evolves, the rights of privacy, autonomy and free exercise of 
religion will acquire new and subtle timbres. Similarly, the 
judiciary faces unprecedented challenges in the nascent arena 
of bioethics. Although few conclusions can be drawn at this 
early stage, the judiciary's application of the Cardozo doctrine 
to cases in which Jehovah's Witnesses choose to reject life-
sustaining blood transfusions surely is a step in the right 
direction. 
1 Schloendoffv. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 
92,93 (1914). 
2 Superintendent of Belchertown School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,370 
N.E. 2d 417, 424 (1977) (where withholding treatment may hasten 
death, best interests of incompetent adult are not necessarily served 
by life-prolonging procedures which diminish quality of life and do 
not reflect person's actual preferences). 
3 Bartlingv. Superior Court, 163 Cal.App.3d 186, 194,209 Cal.Rptr. 
220, 224 (1984). 
4Id See also Bouvia v. SuperiorColJrt, 179 Cal.App.3d 1127,225 
Cal Rptr. 297 (1986). 
~ See Bouvia, 179 Cal.App.3d at 1137, 225 Cal.Rptr. at 30l. 
J See, e.g., Collins v. Davis, 44 Misc.2d 622, 254 N.Y.S.2d 666 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1964). But see Erickson V. Dilgard, 44 Misc2d 27, 252 
N.Y.S.2d 705 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962): In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill.2d 
361,205 N.E.2d 435 (1965). 
7 Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal.3d 229, 242, 104 Cal.Rptr. 505, 502 P.2d 1 
(1972). Similarly, in Bartling, 163 Cal.App.3d 186,209 Cal.Rptr. 
220, and BOlJvia, 179 Cal. App.3d 1127,225 Cal. Rptr. 297, plaintiff 
patients suffered from serious and incurable but not terminal 
conditions. Neither of these plaintiffs were comotose, nor were 
they in a persistent vegetative state. Both plaintiffs successfully 
petitioned the court to recognize their right to withdraw a life-
support system and nasogastric feeding tube, respectively. In these 
two cases terminating medical support systems meant hastening 
rather than directly causing death. In contrast, in Barberv. Superior 
Court, 147 Cal.App.3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983), plaintiff 
patient suffered from a terminal condition. The California court 
held that families and physicians may decide to forego life-
sustaining treatment for persistently vegetative patients without 
judicial involvement. In such cases, terminating life-support 
systems means not merely hastening, but actually causing death. 
8 See Bouvia, 179 Cal.App.3d at 1139, 225 Cal.Rptr. at 302. See 
also Bartling, 163 Cal.App.3d at 194-195, 209 Cal.Rptr. at 224-225. 
9 Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 741, 370 N.E.2d at 425. 
10 See Application of the President & Directors of Georgetown College, 
Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 118 U.S. App. D.C. 80, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978, 
84 S.Ct. 1883, 12 L.Ed.2d 746 (1964) (in which a patient's right to 
refuse treatment was at issue because minor children would be left 
without a parent should the treatment not proceed). 
''\1 The term, ''parens patriae" originates from the British common 
-law system in which the King had a royal prerogative to act as 
guardian to individuals with legal disabilities such as infants, 
children and the mentally enfeebled. In the United States, the 
parens patriae function belongs with the states and their respective 
courts. Black's Law Dictionary 1003 (5th ed. 1979). 
12 278 F.Supp. 488 (W.D. Wash. 1967), affd, 390 U.S. 598 (1968). 
13 Jehovah's Witnesses, 278 F.Supp. at 504, citing Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-167, 170, 64 S. Ct. 438, 442, 444 (footnote 
omitted) (citations omitted). 
14 Conservatorship of Drabick v. Drabick, 200 Cal.App.3d 185, 208, 
245 Cal.Rptr. 840, 854 (1988). 
15Id. 
16Id. at 208,245 Cal.Rptr. at 854-855. 
17Id. at 209-216,245 Cal.Rptr. at 853-858; Barber, 147 Cal.App.3d 
at 1021, 195 Cal.Rptr. at 493. 
18 Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 741 , 370 N.E.2d at 425. 
19 See e.g., John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital v. Heston, 58 N.]. 576, 
582-83,279 A.2d 670,673 (1971); United States v . George, 39 F.Supp. 
752, 754 (D. Conn. 1965). 
20 See, e.g., St. Mary's Hospitalv. Ramsey, 465 So.2d 666, 669 (Fla, 
Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 741,370 N.E.2d at 425. 
21 Bartling., 163 Cal.App. 3d at 195, 209 Cal.Rptr. at 225. See also 
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 744,370 N.E.2d at 427 ("[I]fthe doctrines of 
informed consent and right of privacy have as their foundations the 
right to bodily integrity ... and control of one's own fate, then those 
rights are superior to the institutional considerations.") 
22 See Shorterv. Drury, 103 Wash.2d 645, 695 P.2d 116 (1985), cert, 
~enied, 106 S. Ct. 86 (1985). 
/3Id. at 658,695 P.2d at 123 .• 
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Second National Conference on Health Care for the Elderly 
Co-sponsored by the Center for Christian Bioethics 
and Multidisciplinary Geriatric Council 
~ 
Notable thinkers on health care and the elderly will 
participate in a national conference, "Rationing Health Care: 
Ethics and Aging," at the San Bernardino Hilton on March 1 
and 2. The conference is funded by the National Endowment 
for the Humanities and co-sponsored by Lorna Linda 
University's Center for Christian Bioethics and 
Multidisciplinary Geriatric Council. 
This conference will be the second of two national 
conferences funded through the Ethics and Aging Project, 
directed by James Walters and co-directed by David Larson. 
Papers from the first 1990 conference will soon be available in 
a book edited by Gerald Winslow and James Walters, and 
published by Westview Press, Denver, Colorado. Over twenty 
different writers contributed to the book. This second con-
ference will also result in a book to be edited by David Larson 
and James Walters. A publisher is currently being sought. 
This second conference and its subsequent book will give its 
participants an opportunity to advance the debate on how the 
U.S. health-care system can appropriately care for their grow-
ing populace of senior citizens. 
The participants in this second conference include 
Margaret Battin, University of Utah; Elizabeth Binney, Insti-
tute for Health and Aging; Norman Daniels, Tufts Univer-
sity; Carroll Estes, University of California, San Francisco; 
Nancy Jecker, University of Washington, Seattle; John Kilner, 
Park Ridge Center, Chicago; and Paul Menzel, Pacific 
Lutheran University. Several local ethicists will respond to 
the participants' presentations-Wesley Amundson, David 
Larson and James Walters, Lorna Linda University; Gerald 
CENTER FOR CHRISTIAN BIOETHICS 
Lorna Linda University 
Lorna Linda, California 92350 
Winslow, Pacific Union College; and William Clements, Sr., 
School of Theology at Claremont. 
"Anyone interested in the coming crisis of health care 
and our elderly population will find this working conference 
fascinating," stated James Walters, Director of the Ethics and 
Aging Project. "The conference will have the best of two 
worlds: first, leading thinkers in the field discussing among 
themselves the alternative solutions to the challenges of 
aging and health care; and second, a reality check on theories 
through dialogue with the general public." 
The public is encouraged to attend any portion of th( · 
working conference, to be held in two-hour blocks starting at 
9:30 a.m. through 5:30 p.m. on Sunday, and 8 a.m. through 12 
noon, Monday. This part of the conference will be held in the 
University Room of the San Bernardino Hilton Hotel. 
The public is specifically encouraged to attend the 
keynote panel discussion to be held on Sunday, March 1, 7:30-
9:00 p.m., at the Randall Visitors Center. The Center is 
located at the corner of Anderson Street and University 
Avenue at Lorna Linda University. Both the conference and 
the keynote meeting are open to the public at no cost. 
The Center is co-sponsoring these meetings with the 
Multidisciplinary Geriatric Council. This council is an 
interschool project chaired by Joyce Hopp, Dean, School of 
Allied Health, established to address biomedical challenges 
confronting health-care professionals working with a growing 
populace of elderly. 
Those wanting more information may call the Center 
for Christian Bioethics at (714) 824-4956 .• 
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